Introduction
In recent decades, international organizations (IOs) have become powerful political actors. In the increasingly globalized world, these specialized multilateral institutions often can address the growing amount of cross-border interdependencies more effectively than states individually (Keohane 1984) . To fulfill their tasks, IOs have over time extended their authority and their intrusiveness into the national societies of their member states (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) .
This trend has engendered criticism. A major concern is the lack of democratic control over the activities of international organizations. Many scholars argue that IOs suffer from a 'democratic deficit' as their accountability to the citizens they affect is weak (e.g., Nye 2001) . As a consequence, " [i] nternational organizations are widely believed to undermine domestic democracy" (Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009, 1) . When they exert political influence on their member states IOs limit the role played by domestic politics and in democracies thus reduce the control citizens can exercise on the institutions governing them.
Arguably, this deficit is particularly problematic if IOs have distributional effects. As their influence can then create winners and losers, the absence of democratic control means that citizens lack a mechanism to guide and constrain (re)distributional policies according to their preferences (Gartzke and Naoi 2011) . Since empirical research on the distributional effects of IOs is scarce 1 , this paper, first, aims to augment the literature with causal evidence on their impact on income inequality. Second, I investigate whether the effect I find can indeed be explained by the idea that IOs 'undermine democracy'.
The theoretical argument I develop is based on the widely-held view that democracies tend to exhibit lower levels of income inequality than non-democracies, because their governments are more responsive to the interests of poorer segments of society, who benefit from a relatively egalitarian income distribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981) . I derive the hypothesis that democratically deficient IOs that are powerful enough to affect economic outcomes in member states make inequality rise due to their relative lack of such responsiveness and accountability. If the argument holds, the effect, I argue, should be observable only in democracies: only there can the interference of democratically deficient IOs in national policy-making limit the functioning of domestic accountability mechanisms. Further examining this channel, I expect the efforts to 'democratize' IO decision-making processes, which scholars have noted in recent years, to mitigate this effect (Grigorescu 2015) .
In the empirical part of the paper I focus on the loan programs administered by the IMF to test these hypotheses. The IMF is often considered "the most powerful international institution in history" (Stone 2002, 1) . It has vast financial resources at its disposal and its loan arrangements can make use of conditionality as a potent instrument to directly affect economic policies in program countries. In addition to these theoretical considerations, the fact that almost all developing countries have received IMF loans since the early 1970s underlines the empirical importance of investigating the effects of IMF programs. Furthermore, as IMF programs indicate the direct influence of an IO on a given country for a well-defined period of time, from a methodological perspective they provide an ideal setting for analyzing the hypotheses with international panel data.
The methodological challenge, however, is to establish causality since IMF programs are clearly not randomly assigned. Extant approaches addressing this problem rely on instrumental variables (IVs) that are likely to be related to the outcome through channels other than IMF programs and thus violate the exclusion restriction. To fill this gap, I employ a novel identification strategy for IMF programs inspired by recent methodological innovations (Nunn and Qian 2014; Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen 2009) . I exploit exogenous variation over time in the IMF's liquidity and interact this variable with a country's probability of participating in IMF programs, thereby introducing variation across countries. When controlling for the levels of the interacted variables, this interaction term is excludable to country-specific variables such as income inequality and thus allows me to determine the causal effect of IMF programs. As the exclusion restriction of this new IV holds not only for inequality but also for other economic and political outcomes on the country-level, the methodological section of this paper can be considered as an attempt to provide the literature with a tool to investigate the causal effects of IMF programs at large.
Foreshadowing the main results, I find strong statistical evidence that supports the hypotheses.
IMF programs are shown to increase inequality in democracies but have no such effect in nondemocracies. In democracies, the effect is statistically significant, robust to a battery of additional tests and substantial in magnitude. On average, the rise in inequality induced by IMF programs is equivalent to a lump-sum transfer of four to eight percent of the poorer half's mean income by each person in the poorer half to each person in the richer half. In light of this evidence, the study also adds to the literature on IMF effects that stresses the importance of interaction effects with program countries' political systems (Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012) . More generally, it is a contribution to the growing literature on the causes behind the continuing trend of rising inequality within many countries. 2 2 For an overview on the causes and consequences of inequality see Dabla-Norris et al (2015) . See Piketty (2014) for the contribution that recently sparked a surge of interest in this topic.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The ensuing section presents the theory and derives empirically testable hypotheses. A method to systematically examine these is developed in section 3. Subsequently, the results of this approach are presented in section 4 before their scholarly and political implications are discussed in a concluding section.
Theory and Hypotheses
The 'Democratic Deficit' and Inequality
According to a prominent argument, international organizations suffer from a 'democratic deficit' as the decision-making processes in IOs do not satisfy basic democratic standards. 3 In the literature "[t]he main problem […] of the democratic deficit is generally understood to be the relative lack of accountability of IOs to the individuals whose lives they directly affect" (Grigorescu 2013, 177) . While scholars have discussed many aspects of democratically deficient decision-making in IOs, two dimensions of this 'relative lack of accountability' receive particular attention.
Some scholars emphasize the relative autonomy of IOs and their bureaucracies. In their seminal work, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argue that IOs require a certain degree of independence from national public interests in order to effectively carry out their assigned tasks. Their research as well as many subsequent studies have demonstrated that the bureaucracies of IOs indeed enjoy a significant amount of discretion (Copelovitch 2010; Hawkins et al. 2006; Stone 2011) . Such autonomy, however, naturally limits the citizens' opportunities to influence decision-making in IOs. Global governance, according to Dahl (1994) , thus faces a "democratic dilemma" -a tradeoff between "system effectiveness" and "citizen participation."
Other scholars consider the control powerful governments exert over IOs as more problematic:
"The problem is not a lack of accountability as much as the fact that the principal lines of accountability run to powerful states" (Grant and Keohane 2005, 37) . Indeed, empirical evidence for the disproportional influence of economically large countries on IOs abounds; the United
States and other G7 governments, for instance, have repeatedly been shown to influence decision-making in international financial institutions (e.g., Kilby 2009; Thacker 1999; Vreeland and Dreher 2014) . Governments of countries that usually receive financial assistance from these institutions, however, often have a very limited influence on their general political orientation and the influence of these countries' citizens is even lower.
3 The term was coined by Marquand (1979) to criticize a lack of democracy in the EU but is now widely used and applied to various IOs (e.g., Nye 2001).
Whether IOs are relatively autonomous or largely controlled by the executives of their most powerful members -to the extent that IOs are indeed 'democratically deficient' and "less responsive to the wishes of voters" (Vaubel 2004, 319) than democratic states, their interference with domestic decision-making processes presents a problem for citizens in democracies.
Democracies ensure the responsiveness of their governments to the preferences of their citizens by enabling citizens to hold their governments accountable for their actions (Dahl 1971 ). Yet if powerful IOs temporarily override national political processes and limit the government's autonomy (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006) they weaken democratic accountability mechanisms and undermine this responsiveness. I argue that this may have distributional implications.
According to the standard arguments in the literature, democratic governments promote a more egalitarian distribution of income across society than non-democratic governments. 4 Meltzer and Richard's (1981) prominent model builds on the right-skew of the income distribution to show that the decisive voters earn less than mean income. As democratic governments respond to their interests for redistribution from the rich to the poor, inequality decreases. Broadened access to political power is thus closely linked to broadened access to economic resources (see also and, therefore, tend to provide public goods. As these are mostly funded through progressive taxation and often contribute to mitigating wage differentials, increased public goods provision tends to have distributional implications. While not all empirical studies find the effect, the vast majority of the theoretical literature suggests there is substantial empirical support for these arguments.
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In the terminology of the 'political survival'-framework, democratically deficient IOs may weaken the functioning of domestic democracy because the public of many countries is not part of the 'winning coalition' of the decision-makers in IOs. Neither IO bureaucrats nor the national executives of the most powerful members need their support for political survival. Ordinary citizens, thus, have fewer opportunities to enforce their demands in IOs than they do within autonomous democracies. Instead of being accountable to these citizens, decision-makers in IOs 4 For a recent literature review see Acemoglu et al. (2015) . 5 Empirical support for the link between democracy and lower inequality is reported in, e.g., Blaydes and Kayser (2011) , Reuveny and Li (2003) , Rodrik (1999) . Statistically insignificant or non-robust results for this relationship are, e.g., reported in Acemoglu et al. (2015) , Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) , Scheve and Stasavage (2012) . The empirical link between democracy and higher public goods provision is well established (e.g., Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Jensen and Skaaning 2015) .
will tend to satisfy the interests of those 'winning coalitions' that can actually hold them to account. Provided that trade-offs between these interests and income equality exist (which I show is the case more often than not below), IOs will tend to increase inequality when they exert influence on democracies. In non-democracies, on the other hand, no such effect should be observable because the responsiveness of the governing institutions to citizens is weak irrespective of IO influence. If democratically deficient IOs exert influence on non-democracies the domestic decision-making processes they override are already democratically deficient. In other words, democracy -and its tendency towards income equality -cannot be undermined. If the argument holds, inequality should not be affected.
Hypotheses
To make this general conjecture empirically testable, I specify my hypotheses in the following. As argued in the introduction, among the IOs that focus on economic issues and have the necessary resources and policy instruments, the prime candidate for the analysis for theoretical, empirical and methodological reasons is the IMF. 6 What is more, the IMF has been explicitly criticized for "undermin[ing] the democratic process by imposing policies" (Stiglitz 2000) and in the literature there is ample evidence indicating that the two previously discussed dimensions of the democratic deficit apply directly to the IMF:
On the one hand, scholars emphasize the substantial autonomy of the IMF's bureaucracy. The IMF itself argues that its staff aims to achieve the Fund's main policy goals. Conditionality in IMF programs will therefore "establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund" (IMF Articles of Agreement, Article V, 3a) and thus aim to ensure loan repayment. Moreover, the Fund has often underlined that economic growth and price stability are additional primary objectives of its programs (IMF 2016a; Polak 1991) . In line with public choice theory, IMF staff, however, also face bureaucratic incentives, making the maximization of power and budget key determinants of the IMF's bureaucratic decision-making (Vaubel 1986 ).
Several studies have observed such behavior within the IMF and argue that its officials push for longer programs, larger loans and more far-reaching conditionality than what is economically optimal (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Copelovitch 2010; Vaubel 1996) . Additionally, staff preferences are also determined by the IMF's organizational culture (Chwieroth 2013) . Studies have tracked IMF decision-making to a "neoliberal" ideational culture prevalent among IMF officials resulting from their educational background (Chwieroth 2007) . The finding that program countries with policy-makers whose beliefs are closer to this ideational culture receive favorable treatment from the Fund supports this argument (Nelson 2014) . According to this line of research, IMF decision-making is biased towards "neoliberal", market-based responses to economic problems while Fund officials advocating for government intervention in market processes and outcomes are underrepresented (Chorev and Babb 2009; Chwieroth 2007 Chwieroth , 2010 Stiglitz 2002 ).
On the other hand, research demonstrates that the IMF's most powerful member states exert considerable influence on its decision-making. This is evidenced by countries receiving favorable treatment from the Fund if they are politically close to the United States, geopolitically important, members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), or cast votes in line with the Fund's major shareholders in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and in the UNSC (Dreher and Jensen 2007; Reynaud and Vauday 2009; Stone 2008; Thacker 1999; Vreeland and Dreher 2014) . Countries that are indebted to U.S. commercial banks also receive benefits (Broz and Hawes 2006; Copelovitch 2010; Gould 2003) . The IMF's decision-making, thus, at least partly reflects the financial and (geo-)political interests of its most powerful member governments.
Both Copelovitch (2010) and Stone (2008) provide syntheses of these two arguments. They argue that the staff's influence is conditional on the major shareholders' interest in intervening in IMF decision-making. They empirically show that the staff's impact is most significant when there is "agency slack" because of heterogeneity in the major shareholders' interests (Copelovitch 2010) and when countries are of no particular political importance to the United States (Stone 2008 (Stone , 2011 In sum, for the two major actors within the IMF's decision-making structure, limiting or reducing inequality is not a high-ranking policy goal. Instead, it is obvious that the policy preferences resulting from the staff's main policy goals, bureaucratic incentives and ideational culture, may stand in contrast to the public's distributional preferences: Far-reaching macroeconomic and structural policy conditions with a focus on debt repayment, growth and price stability combined with an inclination toward free-market liberal policies may very well come at the cost of increasing income inequality. And to the extent that geopolitical and financial interests of the major shareholders are also reflected in the design of conditionality in IMF programs, the aim of avoiding adverse distributional effects is further deprioritized. In fact, foreign aid and World
Bank projects have been found to be less effective for developmental goals when they are politically motivated (Dreher, Eichenauer, and Gehring 2016; Kilby 2013 Kilby , 2015 .
7 While the program country certainly also has an impact on the policies implemented under IMF programs (e.g., Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012) , for the hypothesis only the deviation from the country's decision-making in the absence of IMF intervention, the counterfactual, is relevant.
Conditionality in IMF programs with potentially adverse distributional consequences includes, for instance, conditions that aim to reduce financial losses for commercial banks from G7 countries. Gould (2003) has found that their preferences are reflected in "bank-friendly conditions" that give priority to debt repayment, requiring resources that might otherwise be allocated to areas such as social spending. More direct distributional consequences can result from the conditions found in many IMF arrangements that demand cuts in public sector employment and wages (Nooruddin and Vreeland 2010; Rickard and Caraway 2014) .
Furthermore, most IMF programs include conditionality calling for the privatization or restructuring of state-owned enterprises, which in many cases has led to mass layoffs. Conditions on trade and financial liberalization are also common and may increase inequality, e.g., through adverse employment effects on previously protected sectors. 8 Furthermore, the fact that many IMF arrangements request reductions in pensions, employment protection, government expenditure and, minimum wages also can have adverse distributional effects (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016) .
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All in all, these considerations suggest that, due to the policy preferences that shape them, IMF programs can come at the cost of increasing income inequality. Hence, for the empirical analysis the following hypotheses are proposed:
H 1 : IMF programs cause higher income inequality within countries.
H 2 : IMF programs cause higher income inequality in democracies.
H 3 : IMF programs do not cause higher income inequality in non-democracies.
While H 1 is the general hypothesis relevant primarily from an empirical perspective, H 2 and H 3 aim to shed light on the proposed theoretical mechanism: In democracies, IMF programs can weaken existing accountability mechanisms; in non-democracies such mechanisms are weak irrespective of IMF programs being in place.
To further investigate the 'democratic deficit' as a mechanism, I test two additional hypotheses.
So far I have ignored the possibility that the decision-making processes of IOs in general, and of the IMF in particular, could have changed over time. Recent research calls the assumption of stable decision-making processes into question. Confronted with pressures for legitimization, international organizations have reacted by engaging in efforts to enhance accountability mechanisms with citizens in order to move closer to the democratic ideal (Grigorescu 2015) .
One of these efforts is to increasingly grant non-governmental transnational actors (TNAs) access to IOs' decision-making processes (Steffek, Kissling, and Nanz 2008 ). An index developed by Tallberg et al. (2014) measures the degree of such access and provides systematic evidence for an "opening up" of most IOs towards TNAs largely since the 1990s. For the IMF the index shows an increase in TNA access beginning in 1998. To the extent that "[n]on-governmental organizations can democratize IGOs by expanding participation and increasing accountability" (Vabulas 2013, p.194) , I expect this 'democratization' of IOs to mitigate their hypothesized adverse distributional effects. To be sure it is disputed to what extent TNAs actually make IOs more democratic (Agné, Dellmuth, and Tallberg 2015) . Also, more inclusive decision-making processes at the IO level cannot fully remove the concern that intrusive IOs can weaken the functioning of domestic democracy. However, non-governmental organizations often play important roles in lobbying for policies addressing the interests of the poor by giving a political voice to groups that are easy to neglect (Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012) . If they thereby strengthen accountability mechanisms between poorer segments of society and IOs, the latter should become more responsive to these demands and more sensitive to adverse distributional effects:
The effect of IMF programs on income inequality in democracies decreases with increasing TNA access to IMF decision-making.
Another source of variation that can be exploited to make the theoretical explanation more plausible is the difference in IMF lending facilities under which programs are designed. In 1999, the Fund established the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). 10 According to the IMF (2001), "foremost among them [the distinctive features of the new facility] is broad public participation and increased national ownership." In combination with the explicit focus on poverty reduction, the aims to let country authorities lead the process and involve civil society in the program design are an attempt to avoid extensive interference in domestic political systems and strengthen accountability. To the extent that PRGF programs, as a consequence, override the domestic democratic system to a lesser extent, the theoretical considerations suggest the following hypothesis:
The effect of IMF programs on income inequality in democracies is lower in PRGF programs.
The subsequent chapter presents the empirical strategy to test these hypotheses. 10 In 2010, the "Extended Credit Facility" replaced the PRGF.
Method and Data Endogeneity
There is no lack of anecdotal evidence linking IMF programs to rising inequality. Many Latin American, East Asian, and former Soviet countries experienced a divergence in income levels while IMF programs where in place (Klein 2008; Peet 2009; Stiglitz 2002 ) While it is plausible that IMF programs contributed to rising inequality in Argentina, other simultaneous processes may explain this development just as well: The same period was also characterized by years of hyperinflation, economic crises, and high levels of debt -which, in turn, had made continued participation in IMF programs more likely in the first place. It is furthermore not excludable that Menem's government would have implemented similar freemarket liberal reforms by itself in complete absence of IMF influence and that the trend of decreasing inequality after 2004 is linked to the more egalitarian policies under Néstor and Cristina Kirchner's governments rather than to the end of the IMF programs.
The case of Argentina illustrates that the central challenge for any study investigating the causal effects of IMF programs on economic outcomes is nonrandom selection (Przeworkski and Vreeland 2000) . The national economic and political conditions that drive selection into IMF programs are likely related to the determinants of inequality levels and other economic and political outcomes. As IMF programs and inequality could thus be correlated in the absence of a causal effect, regression coefficients could be severely biased without a valid identification strategy. Problematically, not all of the potentially confounding variables are observable. While many key variables that explain IMF programs 11 suffer from missing data, the more limiting problem is that many relevant conditions are intrinsically difficult, if not impossible, to measure.
Vreeland (2002) lists "political will" as an example: Governments that favor IMF programs, e.g., due to a political preference for austerity policies, might also be more likely to implement policies leading to more inequality, irrespective of the presence of an IMF program. The lack of measurement of such variables as "political will" would thus bias the coefficient.
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In theory, there is a straightforward solution to this endogeneity problem, but to applied quantitative research on the IMF it presents a difficulty: "Instrumental variables can address this problem, but they are not easy to come by, especially since so much of what drives selection into IMF programs also influences IMF program effects" (Vreeland 2007, 82 It rests on the assumption that the only channel through which UNGA voting behavior affects macroeconomic outcomes in a country is the presence of an IMF program. But it is likely that a government's preferences in foreign policy articulated in UNGA roll-call votes are related to a 12 Another example is political favoritism. As discussed above, there is increasing evidence that many countries receive IMF programs when this is in the interest of the IMF's most powerful shareholders (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009 ). Many of the various political, economic, geostrategic, and ideological factors that determine these members' preferences are hardly measurable but might be correlated with inequality. 13 For further details regarding problems related to Heckman-models without exclusion restrictions see Puhani (2000) . 14 Alternatively, economic variables such as GDP, budget balance, inflation (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2010) 
In the first-stage equation IMFprogram it is regressed on this interaction term and on all secondstage variables. While year fixed effects control for the level effect of the liquidity ratio, I also control for IMFprob it in both stages. The identification can therefore be interpreted as a difference-in-difference approach: After controlling for the levels, the IV's coefficient indicates how the IMF's liquidity affects the likelihood of receiving an IMF program in year t differently in countries with different participation probabilities. 15 Of the four existing studies on the IMF's distributional effects Pastor (1987) conducts before-and-after comparisons, Garuda (2000) controls only for selection on observables, Vreeland (2002) 
Figure 1
Whereas this 'relevance' of the instrument can and will be tested empirically in section 4, its 'excludability' is untestable and must be theoretically defended. Figure 1 shows the variation of ln(LQR t ) over time. The main sources of this variation are the IMF's Quota Reviews. 18 The
Articles of Agreement (Article III, Section 2a) require the Board of Governors to review the amount of financial resources members commit to the Fund ("quotas") once every five years. In the observation period these reviews led to quota increases in all but three cases (IMF 2016b). In Figure 1 these jumps can be seen, for instance, in the late 1970s, early 1980s and late 1990s when member countries executed their respective payments of the 7 th , 8 th , and 11 th General Review of Quotas. As the timing of the quota reviews follows the mentioned institutional rule and is thus exogenously given, it is very unlikely that they are linked to intra-state income inequality through unobserved channels. Even if this was the case, the correlation between such unobserved variables and the outcome would bias the result only if it was dependent on a country's probability of participating in IMF programs. In other words, a sceptic would have to find unobserved variables that affect the impact of the IMF's liquidity ratio on income inequality conditional on how regularly the country has received IMF programs in the past -after controlling for country and year fixed effects and a large vector of control variables. It is unlikely that such variables exist.
Some readers, however, might worry that the denominator of the liquidity ratio, i.e., the amount of the Fund's liquid liabilities, threatens the excludability of the instrument. While most variation in the liquidity ratio is induced by the changing amount of liquid resources, to a significantly lesser extent it also depends on the liquid liabilities. 19 These vary when economically large members obtain and repay loans that are large relative to total IMF resources ("purchase" and "repurchase" in IMF jargon). 20 In the figure this is visible, for instance, in the mid-2000s when Brazil and Turkey repaid extraordinarily large loans. In general, I argue that this does not undermine the excludability of the IV: First, the vast majority of these flows are not sizable enough to significantly affect the liquidity ratio. As in most cases the amount of resources transferred is significantly less than 1% of total IMF quotas, any concern regarding excludability would relate to very few observations. Second, the timing of such transactions is agreed upon years in advance. Given also that explanatory variables are lagged it is unlikely that the schedule of large transactions developed with economically large countries is correlated with future levels of inequality in specific countries. Third, even if there was a correlation it would have to be conditional on IMFprob because of the difference-in-difference style model the interacted IV estimates. Nevertheless, to be cautious I run a robustness test in which I exclude the 100 observations that exhibit the largest flows from and to the IMF. 21 To address these concerns in the most cautious way possible, I also run regressions using only liquid resources as the timevariant factor of the IV. This variable is, by construction, not determined by the Fund's liquid liabilities.
Econometric Model and Data
Armed with this excludable instrument, I estimate 2SLS panel regressions to identify the causal effect of IMF programs on income inequality:
IMFprogram it-1 = α ln(LQR countries. As not all data are available for all countries and years, the panel is unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the explanatory variables used.
The dependent variable Gini is the Gini-coefficient of net income taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2014) . The SWIID combines source data from multiple inequality databases and, in contrast to other panel datasets like All The Ginis (ATG) (Milanovic 2014) Furthermore, to account for unobserved country-specific characteristics and time-specific trends, I include country and year fixed effects (ξ and ρ). As current levels of inequality are heavily dependent on previous levels it is standard to also include the lagged dependent variable (LDV) (Acemoglu et al. 2015) . 22 In addition, I include a lagged vector of covariates consisting of two variable sets. 23 The first comprises the standard covariates of inequality: GDP/Capita and its square to control for the country's level of economic development including a potential nonlinear relationship à la Kuznets (1955) IMF's liquidity ratio and inequality differently in countries with different levels of IMF participation probabilities.
Results

First-Stage Estimates and Relevance of the Instrument
I begin by testing the relevance of the instrument. These results are robust across different specifications. In column 1, only the levels of the interaction term, the LDV (Gini t-1 ), as well as country and year fixed effects are controlled for.
Under the assumption that the IV is excludable conditional on these variables, this specification without additional control variables already yields an unbiased coefficient of interest in the second stage. Nevertheless, in columns 2 and 3 I successively add the two sets of covariates described above. None of them significantly alters the relevant coefficient, its significance, the Fstatistic or the underidentification test statistics. As previous studies found, countries that participated in IMF programs in the past are significantly more likely to participate in such programs in the present ("recidivism") (Bird, Hussain, and Joyce 2004) . A new finding, however, is that this effect is dependent on the Fund's liquidity. As the negative sign of the interaction term's coefficient indicates and Figure 2 illustrates, in years with higher liquidity ratios the probability of past IMF participation is a weaker, but still significant, predictor of IMF programs. The Fund is, thus, not only more generous in years with higher liquidity ratios 24 but in these years it also implements more programs for countries beyond its more regular clientele. In sum, the IV is plausibly excludable to inequality levels in specific countries, proves to be highly relevant, and allows an intuitive interpretation of its linkage with the presence of IMF programs.
Figure 2 -Visualized Effect of the IV in IMF Programs
Main Results Table 2 presents the results of the second-stage of the 2SLS regressions. Specifications 1-3 correspond to those reported in Table 1 . 25 In line with H 1 , the results show that IMF programs significantly increase income inequality. Across all specifications the coefficient is statistically significant at least at the 5% level (1% in specification 2) and substantial in size. Having an IMF program in year t on average increases the country's Gini coefficient of net income in year t+1 by at least 1.1 points. This result is robust both to different sets of control variables and to different samples, which vary because of missing data for the added controls. 24 The liquidity ratio -which is not included in the regressions because of perfect multicollinearity with year fixed effects -is positively correlated with the number of countries under IMF programs in a given year (r = .3). 25 See Appendix A4 for the full table including the coefficients of the covariates.
To assess the magnitude of the effect, note that it is equivalent to an increase in the Gini coefficient by at least 34% and up to 51% of a within-country standard deviation. As inequality is slow to change, increases in inequality of this size within one year are rare events (8.6% of all observations in the sample). While this indicates a substantial effect size, differences in the Gini coefficient are difficult to interpret directly. Therefore, I expand on a method proposed by Blackburn (1989) Next, I test how IMF programs affect inequality in the longer term. Figure 3 illustrates and Table   3 reports the estimates of the coefficient of interest for the baseline specification (1) with different levels of lags. It indicates that the effect is statistically significant during all of the following five years and strongest and most significant after three years. After six years the effect is no longer significantly different from zero. Results are very similar when adding the control variables (see Appendix A5).
Figure 3 and Table 3 -Long Term Effects Heterogeneous Effects
To shed light on the underlying mechanisms I split the sample into democracies and nondemocracies. 26 Note first the descriptive statistics in Table 4 . They show the average of Gini depending on whether the observation is a democracy and on whether an IMF program was in place and reports t-tests comparing the respective means. As expected, the Gini is significantly higher in non-democracies and in countries under an IMF program. It is furthermore interesting and in line with the hypotheses that the large and highly significant difference in inequality between democracies and non-democracies entirely disappears when only countries under IMF programs are compared. 26 The definition of democracy follows the Polity IV index and treats observations with a Polity score of 6 and higher as democracies (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011) .
As these descriptive statistics are obviously inadequate to isolate the IMF's causal effect, Table 5 presents the 2SLS regression results with the sample split into democracies and non-democracies to test H 2 and H 3 . In columns 1-2 and 5-6 it is split on both stages, in columns 3-4 and 7-8 the fitted values of the variable of interest calculated by means of the entire sample are used.
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Table 4 -Sample Split
Columns 1-4 show that IMF programs increase inequality in democracies. 28 The effect is robust to whether or not control variables are included and whether fitted values from the full or only the democratic sample are used. The Kleibergen-Paap tests show that the instrument maintains its relevance despite the smaller sample size in columns 1 and 2. The point estimates, which are statistically significant across all specifications, range from 1.8 to 2.3 and are, thus, larger compared to the full sample. In terms of within country standard deviations in democracies IMF programs increase inequality by 75 % to 95 % of a standard deviation. Again applying the metric based on Blackburn (1989) , this is equivalent to a transfer of about eight percent of the average poor person's income to the average rich person. As soon as only non-democracies are 27 The latter is a valid strategy to the extent that there is no systematic difference of the IV's effect on IMFprogram between democracies and non-democracies. Theoretically, there is no obvious reason why this should be the case. Empirically, the first-stage regressions for the split samples show that the coefficients of the IV are similar in both samples and only in column 5 do not reach statistical significance at the 10%-level. This suggests that splitting the sample only on the second stage is also valid. Standard errors in these regressions are cluster bootstrapped to account for two-stage estimation. 28 In accordance with the results for long-term effects reported in Note: Specifications as in Table 1 and 2; in columns 1-2 and 5-6 standard errors as before; in the remaining regressions standard errors are cluster bootstrapped.
considered (columns 5-8) the effect entirely disappears. The coefficients are close to zero and not statistically significant at conventional levels.
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In sum, the inequality-increasing effect of IMF programs seems to be entirely driven by the democratic sample. In line with the hypotheses IMF programs appear to weaken the inclination of democratic governments to more egalitarian income distributions. The size of the effect is equivalent to cutting the average difference of approximately four Gini points between democracies and autocracies in half.
Further examining the plausibility of this channel, I test H 4 by including the interaction term IMF×TNA (= IMFprogram × TNAaccess) as an additional regressor (Table 6 columns 1-2). To estimate its coefficient I employ the IV estimator proposed by Bun and Harrison (2014) . 30 As expected, the interaction term enters with a significantly negative coefficient. As the TNA-index is only an approximate measure of how 'democratically deficient' IMF decision-making processes are in different years, the size of the effect should be interpreted with caution. The direction of the effect, however, can be interpreted and supports the expectation that the 'opening up' of the IMF towards societal actors makes the organization more sensitive to the distributional effects of its activities.
In columns 3-6 I test H 5 by separately examining the effects of PRGF programs and other IMF programs in democracies. In line with H 5 there is a substantial difference. The coefficient for PRGF programs is small and not statistically significant at conventional levels. If all other IMF programs are considered, however, the effect on inequality is stronger than in the baseline regressions. As discussed above, the IMF's emphasis on public participation, national ownership and poverty reduction in its PRGF programs can explain why these kinds of lending arrangements have no significant adverse distributional effects. In sum, the empirical tests of hypotheses H 4 and H 5 suggest that variation in the decision-making processes that lead to the design of IMF programs explain variation in the programs' effects on inequality. The more inclusive and democratized these processes are, the smaller are the adverse distributional consequences. 29 Note that in column 5, the specification without control variables and with the sample split on both stages, the IV in the small non-democratic sample is not strong enough to reliably rule out weak instrument bias. Columns 6-8, however, show that the coefficient of interest remains insignificant when the IV's relevance is increased by adding control variables or by using fitted values from the full sample. In column 6 the underidentification hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% level and the F-statistic surpasses Stock and Yogo's (2005) critical values of 6.66 tolerating a 2SLS size distortion of 20%. 30 Bun and Harrison's (2014) "IV3" estimator adds the IV multiplied by TNAaccess as well as IMF×TNA to the set of instruments for IMFprogram while treating IMF×TNA as exogenous. This identification is valid under the plausible assumptions that TNA access to the IMF is exogenous to inequality levels and that the degree of endogeneity of IMF programs and inequality does not depend on TNA access: 
Robustness
I run a series of additional test to confirm the robustness of these results. 31 First, I address concerns regarding the exclusion restriction. Most importantly, the results are robust to excluding the country-year observations with large purchases and repurchases of IMF credit as well as to using only the IMF's liquid resources as the time-varying component of the IV (Table R1) .
Furthermore, substituting the time-varying probability (IMFprob) by a time-constant probability that is multicollinear with country fixed effects also does not affect the results (Table R2) .
Additional tests à la Altonji et al. (2005) show that selection on unobservables relative to selection on observables would have to be more than three times as large and go in the opposite direction if the true effect of the IV on the outcome was in fact zero (Table R3). The same table also reports OLS and reduced form estimates of the baseline specification for comparison.
Second, to make the regressions comparable to previous studies I substitute my IV with UNGA voting (Table R4 , columns 1-3). The results are again similar. The latter variable, however, is less relevant, with F-statistics below critical thresholds in two out of three specifications, and the coefficients of interest are larger. As the estimated inequality-increasing effect in these regressions is equivalent to almost 140% of a within-country standard deviation within one year the plausibility of the effect size is somewhat doubtful. Under the assumption that the IV employed in this paper is excludable, this finding and the fact that UNGA voting enters with a significantly positive sign as a control in the baseline regression (see Appendix A4) suggest the following 31 See Appendix A8 for the tables and a more detailed description of the tests. (Table R4 , columns 4-6). When using the Gini coefficient of market income, the regressions again yield very similar results, suggesting that IMF programs redistribute net income via changes in gross income rather than by means of changes in taxes and transfers (Table R5, columns 1-3). Additionally, I employ ATG data as an alternative to the SWIID (Table R5, columns 4-6). 32 Even though the use of this dataset dramatically reduces the sample size, the results are again robust.
Conclusions
Do international organizations have distributional effects within their member countries?
According to the evidence presented here, the loan programs of the IMF -one of the most powerful IOs -on average lead to redistribution of income from the poor to the rich in participating countries. The analysis suggests that this effect is causal and economically significant. It is observable only in democracies, where IMF programs can restrict the domestic governments' responsiveness to their citizens' preferences, and weakens when the 'democraticdeficit' in IMF decision-making is mitigated.
For the IMF -whose Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, recently claimed that "reducing excessive inequality […] is not just morally and politically correct, but it is good economics" (IMF 2015) -the main result highlights an unintended consequence of its lending arrangements. It may encourage the Fund to revise its policy advice and conditionality with regards to their distributional implications. Interestingly, the identified heterogeneous effects that shed light on the underlying channels give hope that such revisions can indeed make a difference. They indicate that the Fund's relative lack of accountability to affected societies is likely to drive the adverse distributional consequences found in the data. When the IMF, however, gives greater autonomy to the program country's national political process, as is the case in PRGF programs, and allows societal actors to have more influence over decision-making processes, these effects are mitigated. For internal Fund policies these results suggest that reforms aiming at so-called 32 For a criticism of the SWIID's approach see Jenkins (2015) . For a defense see Solt (2015) .
"country ownership" and "participatory processes," are -if implemented as articulated -likely to reduce adverse distributional consequences (IMF 2014).
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For international organizations more generally, the main result clearly indicates the political power they can possess. Their activities not only affect public goods provision and general welfare, but can also have a distributional dimension. From a normative perspective, such distributional power already points to the need for more effective accountability mechanisms between IOs and affected societies to ensure that the allocation of gains and losses is under democratic control. The empirical analysis, by revealing that the effect of IMF programs varies depending on the regime type, supports the view that such democratic control over IOs is weak.
Apparently, the interference of a powerful IO in national democratic systems can undermine extant domestic accountability mechanisms. As a consequence, policy outcomes may deviate from those produced in functioning democracies. To counteract this unintended effect, 'democratizing' IOs themselves can help. The study shows that enhanced democratic accountability mechanisms in IOs, apart from being normatively desirable, can also produce better policy results. t-1973 Own calculation based on (Dreher 2006 Gini coefficient (Giniall) according to the ATG Dataset (Milanovic 2014) Note: The sample of the full specification ( Knowing M and the poorer half's share of total income S, the mean income of the poorer half P is given by
The lump-sum transfer relative to the poorer half's mean income is, hence, given by: 
Appendix A6: Robustness
This section describes in more detail the robustness tests summarized in the results section. As discussed in section 3, some readers might be concerned that the large purchases and repurchases of IMF resources that affect the Fund's liquid liabilities could be correlated with inequality levels through channels other than IMF programs even after conditioning on the IMF participation probability. I therefore exclude the country-years with the 100 largest flows from and to the IMF. 34 As the first three columns in Table R1 show, the results do not differ substantially. An even more cautious approach is presented in the remaining three columns. In these regressions I substitute the ratio between liquid resources and liquid liabilities (the liquidity ratio) by liquid resources only. By refraining from dividing the variable by liquid liabilities, I only exploit variation in liquid resources, whose only substantial source of variation is the exogenous timing of quota reviews. While the instrument's relevance naturally decreases because some valuable variation is lost, it is still strong enough to confirm the robustness of the result to this alternative specification.
Another modification concerns the second factor of the interacted instrument (Table R2) 
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I thereby make the probability perfectly multicollinear with the country fixed effects. While I am more convinced by the time-varying probability because it avoids using future realizations to explain the present, the results are robust to this modification.
In the next table I report OLS and reduced form estimates (Table R3) . First, I run OLS and OLS-fixed effect (FE) models (columns 1-2) and then calculate the OLS estimates for the baseline model, i.e., I do not instrument for IMF programs, ceteris paribus (columns 3-5). As the results show, IMF programs are correlated with higher inequality in OLS and OLS-FE regressions without control variables but there is no correlation when endogeneity is only insufficiently addressed in OLS-FE models with different sets of control variables. Together with the statistically significant effect found in the 2SLS regressions these results suggest that the proposed IV is able to eliminate the selection bias the OLS coefficients suffer from. In columns 6-8 I report the results of reduced form regressions of the baseline specifications. They show that the IV has a statistically significant effect on inequality. This relationship is not significantly affected when a large vector of control variables is added to the regression. Following Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) this enhances the plausibility of the exclusion restriction: The comparison of the β-coefficients of the models with and without these covariates (6 vs. 8) shows that the so-called "selection ratio" is 3.12. This means that if the effect, which I claim is causal, was in reality driven by unobserved variables, this selection on unobservables would have to be more than three times as large as the selection on observed variables, and it would have to go in the opposite direction.
To compare the results to studies using the standard instrument for IMF programs, I substitute the IV with UNGA voting behavior ceteris paribus (Table R4 , columns 1-3). These regressions estimate IMF programs to cause rises in inequality of approximately four Gini points, comparable to Oberdabernig (2013) , who uses the same IV. Considering that the estimated coefficients are equivalent to a change of up to 140% of a within country standard deviation, this effect is strikingly large. One reason why these coefficients may be biased is that the instrument is not relevant enough; in specifications 2 and 3 the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics even fall below Stock and Yogo's (2005) lowest critical value of 5.53 that tolerates a 2SLS size distortion of 25%. A second reason could be that the instrument is not excludable. As argued above, plausible alternative channels are governments' political and ideological preferences. Under the assumption that my IV strategy identifies the true causal effect of IMF programs, the baseline regressions reported in Table 2 (Appendix A4) even provide empirical evidence for the violation of the exclusion restriction of UNGA voting: In the full baseline specification voting similarity with the U.S. in the UNGA is correlated with higher levels of inequality when controlling for the causal effect of IMF programs. This finding suggests that UNGA voting is linked positively to inequality through channels other than IMF programs and is, thus, an invalid instrumental variable when the outcome of interest is inequality.
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As a last step, I modify the main variables of interest. Regarding the independent variable, the paper so far followed the conventional practice of the literature on IMF program effects by jointly considering Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) (e.g., Oberdabernig 2013). Barro and Lee (2005, 1248) , however, argue that only SBA and EFF programs should be considered while the others "should be viewed more as foreign aid, rather than lending or adjustment programs." In Table R5 (columns 4-6) I follow their approach and find that the results hold when only SBA and EFF programs are considered.
gross income (Gross Gini), which is also taken from the SWIID. The fact that the results are very similar, indicates that IMF programs affect inequality mainly by leading to changes in the distribution of wages in contrast to affecting the extent of redistribution. This could, for instance, be driven by cuts in public salaries and pensions or by rising unemployment after privatizations.
Future research could investigate the exact channels in more detail. As a final robustness test I change the inequality dataset. Until here I followed the related literature (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2015; Oberdabernig 2013; Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014) in choosing the SWIID as the source for panel data on Gini coefficients. Jenkins (2015) however, voices concerns about the SWIID's methodology and recommends the World Income Inequality Database (WIID), on which the SWIID builds, over the SWIID. 36 The WIID, however, offers multiple Gini coefficients for many country-year observations. Since there is no commonly accepted procedure for choosing the respective values, the use of the WIID for regression analyses necessitates quite arbitrary decisions. This is presumably also why the SWIID is used much more frequently than the WIID. 37 An alternative is offered by Milanovic (2014) , who derives the final Gini value if multiple observations exist through "choice by precedence." While this approach makes sure that in each case the observation of the highest possible quality is chosen, it combines data from nine different sources with different methodologies without further standardization. The author himself advises caution when using the resulting variable Giniall in regressions as the concepts underlying the calculation of the Gini coefficients are based on income and consumption, net and gross, as well as household and individual levels. Unfortunately, too few observations remain if the sample is restricted to one concept. Nevertheless, to address this issue I control for dummy variables that indicate the respective concepts interacted with country fixed effects. Columns 4-6 in Table R5 report the results. Note that, compared to the baseline, the sample size is severely limited. Nevertheless the coefficient of interest is statistically significant in the specifications that include control variables and even somewhat larger than in the baseline.
I conclude that the results are robust to these modifications. 36 The concerns, however, relate to an older version of the SWIID and Solt (2015) is able to overcome many of these concerns. The reader is referred to the entire special issue of the Journal of Economic Inequality (December 2015, Volume 13, Issue 4) for details. 37 On Google Scholar the SWIID has 732 citations, while the WIID has 10 (May 20, 2016, search term "world income inequality database"). 
